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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the causal relationship between the ownership concentration, insider ownership and operational 
performance using a sample of 4.163 Portuguese SMEs and panel data models. The main results show an 
endogenous and dynamic relationship between those variables. The quadratic specification established between 
ownership concentration and operational profitability suggests that for low levels of control rights the expropriation 
hypothesis prevails and for high levels the supervision hypothesis prevails. It was also possible to validate the effect 
of entrenchment and convergence of interests in the relationship established between the insider ownership and 
performance.  
Keywords: ownership concentration, insider ownership, operational performance, non-linear effects, SMEs, 
dynamic panel data 
1. Introduction 
In recent years numerous works have turned their attention to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by virtue of 
their importance in terms of economic activity, job creation, innovation and ability to generate wealth in most 
economies (Behr, Norden, & Noth, 2013). In market systems, survival issues and the complexity and dynamism of 
the business environment require an increasingly deep understanding of organizations in general and SMEs in 
particular, as well as key variables or factors to their performance. 
As highlighted by agency theory, ownership concentration affects the relationship of the SMEs with other 
stakeholders, investment opportunities, company growth and consequently their performance. Dispersed ownership 
can lead to communication and coordination problems as a result of the diversity of owners and the separation of 
ownership and control (Chu, 2011, Wu, Xu, & Phan, 2011). Meanwhile, supervision of the managers/directors by the 
owners intends to prevent unsuitable management practices or behaviours which are inconsistent with what must be 
the main objective of the principal (maximizing value for the owner), limiting management’s immunity, known as 
“entrenchment” in the literature. Supervision, however, has costs and provides benefits to all of the owners in 
proportion to their holdings, so that few are interested in doing it. This phenomenon leads to “free-riding” problems 
and reduced performance. With a small number of owners the communication and coordination problems decrease as 
interests are more aligned, which can lead to greater oversight (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) or to less expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Agency theory has contributed to the understanding of the problems underlying the conflict within organizations. 
From the conflicts of interest that can be generated between the various stakeholders, the literature has given greater 
attention to: i) conflicts between owners and managers/directors, ii) conflicts of interest between owners and the 
company’s creditors (Jensen & Mecklin, 1976), and iii) conflict between majority and minority owners, leading to 
problems of expropriation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
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In the scenario of apparent conflict, our main aim is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure 
(concentration and insider ownership) and operational performance using panel data models. In addition, we intend 
to study whether operational performance and ownership concentration, on the one hand, and insider ownership and 
operational performance, on the other, establish reciprocal relationships and to assess their interdependence using a 
system of simultaneous equations.  
The main results show that ownership concentration has a U-shaped relationship with operational performance, in 
line with what Hu and Izumida (2008) obtained for Japanese family businesses. When compared with those obtained 
in similar studies in the Spanish business environment, they suggest an inverse relationship to that obtained by 
Miguel, Pindado and Torre (2004) for listed companies and confirm the relationship formulated but not validated by 
Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010) for unlisted companies. The effects of entrenchment and convergence of 
interests are also confirmed in the relationship established between the insider ownership and operational 
profitability. 
This paper is organized as follows. In addition to this introduction, it is comprised of five more sections. The second 
section is devoted to background research. The third section focuses on research design (hypotheses and proposed 
models). The fourth section presents the methodology, sample, data and variables. The results are presented and 
discussed in the fifth section. Finally, the sixth section presents the main conclusions of this study and suggests 
avenues for future work. 
2. Research Background 
The relationship between the ownership concentration, insider ownership and performance in companies has been an 
important and controversial issue in corporate governance. Agency theory states that the ownership structure is an 
important determinant of performance – causality of property for performance (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010, Arosa et 
al., 2010). However, studies such as those by Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Holderness (2003) argue that 
causality may be in the opposite direction under some circumstances – causality of performance for ownership 
structure. Although the impact of ownership structure on performance has been explored in the literature (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Miguel et al., 2004), studies on the effect of performance feedback on ownership 
structure, are scarce and have been limited to the North American reality (e.g., Demsetz, 1983, Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985).  
Research conducted on U.S. firms is based on a highly dispersed ownership, whereby it may have limited 
applicability (Cho, 1998, Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). In fact, continental countries are characterized by a 
concentrated ownership and strategically oriented towards stable relationships. These relationships ensure 
sustainable development rather than favouring performance or control rights over the company. In this context, the 
following questions are raised: i) if the ownership held by the main owners and by managers/directors plays an 
important role in determining corporate operational profitability, and ii) do the owners and the managers/directors 
change their level of ownership according to the company's operational profitability.  
2.1 Ownership Concentration and Performance 
Ownership concentration is one of the main mechanisms of corporate governance which influences agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Based on this premise, the effect of ownership concentration on performance has been 
widely documented in the literature with particular attention to companies in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Since dispersion creates free riding problems and makes it difficult to supervise, a positive relationship is 
expected between ownership concentration and corporate performance. Consistent with this hypothesis supervision, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) refer to the important role played by large owners, and how the stock price rises as the 
percentage of shares held by them increases. Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that owners with a high stake in the 
company show greater willingness to play an active role in decisions as they can internalize the benefits of their 
monitoring effort. The method used by large owners to oversee the management/administration is a result of informal 
agreements drawn up amongst them (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, ownership concentration can lead to 
conflicts between controlling and minority owners leading to worse performance, as advocated by expropriation 
hypothesis. The divergences induce a perverse widespread problem in that the controllers expropriate wealth from 
minority owners. Small investors fear being expropriated through inefficient investments yielding higher costs for 
the company (La Porta, Florencio, & Shleifer, 1999). Sheifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in some countries, the 
agency costs resulting from the conflict of interest between controlling and minority owners are much more 
significant than those resulting from the separation of ownership and management (administration). Thus, high levels 
of ownership can generate costs, particularly when the majority owners do not redistribute wealth equitably with 
minority owners, because their interests do not always coincide. 
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Several authors analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and performance to determine the 
existence of an optimal structure. For example, in a study conducted on 470 companies listed in the UK, Leech and 
Leahy (1991) document an inverse linear relationship between ownership concentration and performance. The same 
relationship was observed by Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) for a sample of 
British and German companies, respectively.  
Meanwhile, a linear and positive relationship between ownership concentration and performance is validated for a 
group of U.S. (e.g., Hill & Snell, 1988, Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990), Japanese (e.g., Kaplan & Minton, 1994, 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998) and German (e.g., Gorton & Schmidt, 2000) companies. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) 
reported that investors in the Japanese institutional context, are rather unprotected by the legal system and ownership 
is highly concentrated. Thus, minority owners, unlike what happens in other countries, are not expropriated since 
banks play an important role in corporate control. This leads to a convergence of interests between different owners 
and managers/directors. 
Yet, when the dominant owners have enough power to control, they can maximize personal wealth at the expense of 
the company’s value, leading to a conflict of interests between the majority and minority owner. In this sense, 
Miguel et al. (2004), while analyzing listed Spanish companies, conclude by a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and the companies’ market value. In particular, they conclude that companies’ market value 
increases until ownership concentration reaches 87 percent as a result of the effect of supervision, but beyond this 
point minority owners may be expropriated. This leads to a decrease in the value of the company. Thus, an inverted 
U-shaped relationship is found. In order to explain the results obtained, the authors refers to a set of institutional 
features of the Spanish corporate governance system which differentiates it from previous studies, including: the 
level of ownership concentration, the effectiveness of boards of directors, the development of the capital market, the 
monitoring activity of the market over business activity, and the legal protection of investors. Other authors (e.g., 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998, Anderson & Reb, 2003) also provide support for a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and performance, diverging, however, as to the value from which the effect of supervision 
replaces that of expropriation. This difference stems from different corporate governance systems, the legal 
protection of investors, the development of capital markets, the role of the market in corporate control, the industrial 
sector, among others (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, La Porta, López, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
In a more recent study of unlisted Spanish SMEs, Arosa et al. (2010) report that no relationship was identified 
between ownership concentration and performance. No evidence was found to corroborate the expropriation and 
supervision hypothesis for the companies analyzed. That is, the results obtained by Miguel et al. (2004), is based 
listed Spanish companies is uncorroborated for unlisted companies. In this case, the level of ownership concentration 
has no direct influence on the owners’ behaviour. This may be related to the status of unlisted companies and their 
ownership concentration. Nevertheless, when dividing the sample depending on the nature of the ownership, the 
results suggest that the relationship between ownership concentration and performance differs depending on the 
generation which generates/manages the enterprise. In first-generation family businesses, a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance is found for low levels of control rights, so that the supervision 
hypothesis prevails; a negative relationship is found for high levels of control rights, as expected by the expropriation 
hypothesis. 
In the context of Japanese manufacturing enterprises, Hu and Izumida (2008) conducted a study where they analyze 
the causal relationship between ownership concentration and performance. The results suggest a U-shaped 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance, in line with the expropriation effect predominant in 
low levels of ownership and the supervision effect for intermediate levels of ownership, indicating that both 
dispersed ownership and high ownership concentration are associated with improved performance. On the other hand, 
they showed an insignificant effect of performance on ownership concentration, supported by the fact that capital 
markets have low liquidity, which prevents larger owners from changing their portfolios depending on performance. 
Considering the results, they conclude that ownership concentration is not determined by performance in illiquid 
markets, where it is difficult to transact and change ownership in response to changes in circumstances. 
2.2 Insider Ownership and Performance 
The relationship between insider ownership and performance can also be seen, within the context of agency theory, 
as one of the most relevant contributions to reduce agency problems between different stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b, Demsetz & Lehn, 1985, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Indeed, when the manager/director has no holding, he 
may not have sufficient incentives to develop creative activities (often required to maximize the company’s value) 
such as, seeking innovative investment projects or incorporating new production technologies, leading to myopic 
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policies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The manager/director’s stake in the capital can be a tool which will make him 
be more efficient or lead others to be so. Short-term incentives (salary) can be linked to long-term incentives 
(depending on results) translated by shares in the company, which serve as incentives or complementary 
compensatory systems to enhance the manager/director’s preference for long-term results (Gaver & Gaver, 1993). 
Jensen (1993) proposes a combination of incentives to increase shareholder value. Thus, the manager/director is 
rewarded by increasing their wealth and differences between managers/directors and owners are reduced (Mehran, 
1995). Thus, managers/directors may receive stock or stock options. 
In addition to ownership concentration, the company’s performance can be influenced the decisions of the 
managers/directors and the way they use company resources to maximize personal wealth at the expense of business 
results (Oswald & Jahera, 1991, Pegels, Song, &Yong, 2000). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the natural 
tendency of managers/directors is to affect the company's resources for their own interests, which may lead to 
conflicts with other stakeholders. As insider ownership increases, interests converge and thus conflicts between 
managers/directors and owners tend to be resolved (Miguel et al., 2004). This convergence of interests hypothesis 
suggests that the company increases its value when the level of insider ownership rises. Nevertheless, high levels of 
insider ownership can generate costs as Fama and Jensen (1983a) point out. When the manager/director owns a 
substantial fraction of the company’s capital, this gives him voting power and/or significant influence. This, in turn, 
may not comply with the objectives of maximizing value, without jeopardizing their employment and therefore their 
salary (Miguel et al., 2004).  
Since one of the objectives pursued by governance mechanisms is to prevent managers/directors from taking 
inadequate measures or from performing in a manner that is inconsistent with maximizing value to the owner, a 
phenomenon of management immunity can sometimes develop. This is known in the literature as ‘management 
entrenchment’ (Costa, 1998). According to Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), ‘management entrenchment’ reflects 
the situation in which managers/directors are immune to the discipline imposed by a wide range of control 
mechanisms. The level of the managers/directors’ ‘entrenchment’ may be enhanced by several factors, particularly 
the weight of ownership held and voting power in decision-making (Demsetz, 1983, Fama & Jensen, 1983b, 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). 
Opposing effects of insider ownership on firm value, alignment of interests and management entrenchment, suggest a 
non-linear relationship between insider ownership and company performance. For low levels of insider ownership, 
there is a convergence of interests, agency costs decline and performance improves. In intermediate levels of insider 
ownership convergence costs (coincidence of ideas about how to run the business) outweigh gains and interest 
between managers and other owners may differ (Del Brio, Maia-Ramires, & De Miguel, 2011). In order to maximize 
their own interest managers/directors can divert results and other company assets under their control, enjoy higher 
remuneration, place unqualified relatives in management positions, or become irreplaceable (La Porta, López, 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, 2000, Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001).  
Managers/directors can also choose to invest in projects that would be rejected when the rate of return required by 
the owners is considered, but which would meet their own expectations (Lisboa, 2007). For higher levels of insider 
ownership performance increases again, as the owner/manager/director of the company has additional incentives in 
valuing share price (Loderer & Martin, 1997). A review of relevant literature (e.g., Mudambi & Nicosia, 1998, 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001, Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998, Miguel et al., 2004) suggests that the relationship 
between insider ownership and performance has two inflection points; however, studies are not unanimous as to the 
percentage at which the inflection occurs and diverge in the models and variables used. 
Most studies indicate that ownership concentration and insider ownership have a positive impact on performance. 
Nevertheless, Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) question this causal relationship, indicating that 
ownership concentration should be thought of as endogenous, a consequence of the decisions of maximizing results 
for owners. Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Glenn Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) suggest 
that the variables of ownership are determined in equilibrium, endogenously. The positive or negative causal effect 
of performance on ownership is also reported by Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Holderrness, (2003). Expecting 
better performance, the owners who are controllers increase their holdings in order to have greater control and obtain 
a higher income, assuming good performance persists, thereby constituting an indicator of the positive effect of 
performance on ownership concentration (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Conversely, if the value of the company is too high 
in relation to expectations generated and participation is subject to high risks, the owners are driven to sell part of 
their holdings. In this situation there is a negative effect of performance on ownership concentration (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). However, Zhou (2001) finds that ownership concentration has remained stable over the years, leading him to 
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conclude that significant costs of adaptation and coordination make adjustments of ownership concentration more 
difficult. 
Within the context of SMEs in general and family firms, in particular, ownership concentration often leads to the 
controlling shareholder/partner performing activities designed to extract private benefits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 
La Porta et al., 2000) by which operational profitability as a mechanism to induce greater participation by 
managers/directors in the company's capital and convergence of interests becomes less relevant. In this sense, some 
studies (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, Demsetz, 1983) suggest that controlling family shareholders/partners tend to 
defend their own interests, treating the company as a tool to provide employment to the family or as a way to obtain 
financing thereby limiting the top positions to family members. 
3. Research Design 
The focus of the related literature is usually on large firms with dispersed capital. The question, however, of 
assessing whether the results remain valid for small and family-oriented businesses has come up. To begin with, 
family owners, unlike the others, are more interested in the long term survival of the company. Agency problems 
seem less important in the context of these companies because the controlling owners already have enough 
incentives that give them power and information to control top managers/directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Nevertheless, high levels of ownership concentration can trigger other problems and other costs in the context of 
corporate governance. The free-rider and management entrenchment problems of the family members can override 
or even exceed the benefits of the agency agreement between owners and managers/directors (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001, Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). Conversely, the long term presence of family 
members in the company can increase the quality of results (Wang, 2006) and facilitate the company’s technological 
knowledge, thus improving performance (Martikainen, Nikkinen, & Vähämaa, 2009). 
On the other hand, concern for reputation and the intention of preserving the family name are likely to involve a 
greater commitment on the part of owners, producing positive economic impacts. Family ties and reputation may 
limit the manager/director’s acting for his own benefit when their family members manage the company (Denis, 
1994). The family reputation may also foster long-term relationships, leading, for example, to a reduction of conflict 
of interests between owners and creditors and a lower cost of financing (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
Problems arising from the separation of ownership and control are reduced in first generation family businesses 
because the same person is responsible for the management/administration, for investment decisions and supervision 
(Schulze et al., 2001). Agency costs can be reduced by completely eliminating separation of ownership and control. 
In these cases, the interests of the principal and the agent are aligned, so that the management will not expropriate the 
wealth of the owners (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). When the company incorporates later generations, priorities 
are altered; ownership is shared by a growing number of members and conflicts can arise if interests are not aligned, 
and the relationships between the various participants are influenced by economic and personal preferences 
(Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005, Sharmaa, Hoyb, Astrachanc, & Koiranen, 2007). Over time the economic 
incentive to maximize personal utility can induce the controlling owner to confuse family objectives (interests) with 
the business objectives (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002). According to Anderson and Reeb (2003), the founding 
owner grants the company valuable capabilities, unlike his successors who intervene less towards productivity and 
efficiency. This argument is consistent with empirical evidence which testifies that firms managed by their founder 
perform better than others (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006, Baraontini & Caprio, 2006, Pindado, Requejo, & de la 
Torre, 2011).  
Based on the theoretical references developed in the previous section we have formulated the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the company’s operational 
profitability, which first increases and then decreases. 
To test this hypothesis, the following model was estimated: 
ititittiit CCERAERA    21412)1(1110                      (Model 1) 
where ERA and C represent operational profitability and ownership concentration, respectively.  
As shown in the model, operational profitability in time t is a function of operational profitability at time t-1. The 
persistence of results – the company that operates well can continue to do so (Goddard & Wilson, 1999) – leads the 
operational profitability of the previous year to be positively associated with that of the current year. The literature 
review states that the effect of supervision and expropriation may occur simultaneously, suggesting a non-linear 
effect. The main advantage of the linear quadratic regression model is the presence of an inflection point, which 
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takes in a change in the slope, the earliest symptom of the prevalence of the supervision and expropriation 
hypotheses. 
Another aim is to investigate empirically if age is a potentiating factor of the effect of ownership concentration on 
operational profitability, reflected in the fact that it reduces or increases the magnitude and direction of this effect. 
The importance of considering this effect has already been suggested by Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000). 
The classification of companies based on age is associated with two recent problems in research: i) the decision of 
succession within the family business and ii) the generation of the family that exercises domination. Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzon (2007) report a decline in corporate performance with the succession of 
family managers/directors. They also reveal that companies where the founder is in charge of 
management/administration show better performance in relation to others (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
Therefore, we formulate the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between ownership concentration and operational profitability is stronger in young 
companies than in ‘mature’ ones. 
To test this hypothesis in Model 1 a dummy variable YM is introduced. It takes the value “one” if the company is 
young and zero in all other cases and a model is formulated in which the existence iterative effects between 
ownership concentration and this dummy is admitted. For purposes of classification as “young” and “mature”, we 
felt that a company is “young” when its age is below the sample mean in line with (Pindado et al., 2011). 
ititititittiit CYMCYMERAERA    225242322)1(2120 )()(           (Model 2) 
where ERA and C represent operational profitability and ownership concentration, respectively. YMit is a dummy 
which equals 1 if the age of the company is lower than the mean and zero otherwise. 
Regarding insider ownership the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: A company’s operational profitability increases with insider ownership for low and high levels (as a 
result of the effect of convergence of interest) and decreases for intermediate levels (as a result of the 
effect the managers’ entrenchment). 
In order to test this hypothesis, a model that postulates a cubic relationship between operational profitability and 
insider ownership was formulated.  
itititittiit IOIOIOERAERA    33423332)1(3130                   (Model 3) 
where ERA is the operational profitability and IO, IO2,and IO3, is the percentage of equity held by managers/directors, 
its square and its cube, respectively. 
A fourth hypothesis addresses the effect of operational profitability on ownership concentration: 
Hypothesis 4: The company’s operational profitability has a positive impact on ownership concentration which is an 
incentive for the owner to exert greater control. 
To test this hypothesis, the model is as follows: 
ittiittiit ERAERACC    )1(4342)1(4140                      (Model 4) 
where C and ERA represent ownership concentration and operational profitability, respectively. 
In opposition to the causality advocated in Hypothesis 1, performance has been recognized to have an inverted 
relationship on ownership concentration in the literature (e.g., Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000, Holderness, 2003). 
Companies with good operational profitability are a strong incentive for concentrating ownership, resulting in greater 
control and/or a higher volume of rights on the assumption that it will persist, indicating a positive effect. 
Regarding what conditions insider ownership, corporate performance is a strong incentive for greater involvement of 
the manager/director in the company’s equity. 
Hypothesis 5: The company’s operational profitability has a positive impact on insider ownership constituting an 
incentive to practice efficient management/administration and to reduce conflicts between owners and 
managers/directors. 
To test this hypothesis, the following model was estimated: 
ittiittiit ERAERAIOIO    )1(5352)1(5150                    (Model 5) 
where IO and ERA represent insider ownership and operational profitability, respectively. 
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4. Methodology, Sample, Data and Variables 
4.1 Methodology 
Panel data is used to estimate the models formulated. This choice is motivated by the relevance of two important 
issues in the study of the impact of ownership concentration and insider ownership on operational profitability: i) 
unobserved heterogeneity (corporate characteristics that influence operational profitability are difficult to measure or 
obtain) and ii) problems of individual endogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity was controlled the through the 
individual effect i,- corporate specificities giving rise to specific behaviour, and the effect of time, dt. What is 
considered the error term in the model, ߥ௜௧ is divided into three distinct components: the first is the individual effect i, the second dt the time effect and the third μ,it random disturbance. Moreover, the potential endogeneity of 
ownership concentration and insider ownership may condition the relationship with operational profitability, so that 
instrumental variables are used and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
Consider the following generic specification for a data panel model referring to the sectional unit i at moment t 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ β଴୧୲ ൅ ∑ ߚ௞௜௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅௞௜ୀଵ ߥ௜௧     i = 1,…N and t = 1,….T 
where: 
௜ܻ௧  - observed value of the dependent variable for individual i at moment t 
β଴୧୲ - independent regression term for individual i at moment t 
ߚ௞௜௧ - regression coefficient of the K variable for individual i at moment t 
௜ܺ௧ -  observed value of explanatory variable K for individual i at moment t 
ߥ௜௧ - residual term (the regression error) for individual i at moment t, equal to i + dt + μit     
N -  number of sectional units (individuals) 
T -  number of time periods 
Decomposition of the error term allows the panel data methodology to consider that the effect is not observed, i is 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Since i is constant over time, data over two consecutive periods can be 
distinguished, giving rise to a new equation, known as the first-difference equation, where i is not found (it was 
removed by differentiation). The inclusion of lagged values for the explanatory variables gives rise to endogeneity, 
reflected in the fact that it is correlated with the error term, so that the estimators obtained by the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method are biased and inconsistent. Thus, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used in 
estimating our models, which allows us to control endogeneity using instruments - variables that satisfy two 
conditions: i) not being correlated with ߥ௜௧, i.e. Cov ( ܼ௜௧ , ߥ௜௧) = 0 and ii) they are correlated with ௜ܺ௧, i.e. Cov 
(ܼ௜௧ ,	 ௜ܺ௧) ≠ 0. 
Under the GMM, the best known test is the over-identification test, or J test proposed by Hansen, which allows the 
quality of the instruments to be measured. The clearest way to test the specification of a model is to check if the 
values of all the conditions of the sample moments are close to zero or not, since the GMM only requires their k 
linear combinations to be. The J statistic has an asymptotic distribution of chi-square with s-k degrees of freedom. 
In models with time series the presence of a positive correlation between adjacent errors is often found, symbolically 
expressed by E(εi, εj) ≠ 0, i ≠ j. One of the situations in which the regressores are not strictly exogenous occurs 
when the model contains a lagging dependent variable: ௜ܻ௧ and μit are correlated. To test the autocorrelation of the 
error term we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) statistic for autocorrelation under the null hypothesis of zero serial 
correlation. Negative serial correlation in the first order differences is expected, resulting from the relationship 
between Δεi,t and Δεi,t-1 through the εi, t-1 term, so that a serial correlation of order r with r = 2, ..., T should be 
sought. 
The need to estimate the mutual relations between operational profitability, ownership concentration and insider 
ownership requires a simultaneous equations model to be adopted, with a number of equations equal to the 
endogenous variables. The existing statistical programs (e.g., STATA) do not include routines for estimating systems 
of simultaneous equations with panel data, considering them cross-section data, leading to inefficient estimates. 
4.2 Sample, Data and Variables 
The selecting SMEs as object of study arises from the fact that they possess a set of particular characteristics. Firstly, 
because in most cases they are unlisted companies, they face greater information problems compared to larger 
enterprises. The tenuous separation between ownership and management in SMEs, greatly increases information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Secondly, SMEs are limited in obtaining external funds from financial 
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institutions to the extent that the market is accessible only to large companies both, by virtue of transaction costs, and 
by the information asymmetries that small firms are exposed to. Thirdly, these firms are of particular importance in 
the fabric of most entrepreneurial economies, and Portugal is no exception. According to a study by the IAPMEI 
Planning and Studies Directorate in February 2008, SMEs represent 99.6% of the Portuguese business units, creating 
75.2% of private employment and performing over half of all turnover (56.4%) generating about 2.1 million jobs and 
over €170.3 billion turnover. 
The study is carried out on a set of non-financial firms over the period from 2003 to 2008. The period time 
considered, 2003-08, allows two of the methodology’s limitations to be controlled for: unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity. Thus, information for a period of at least four consecutive years by the company becomes necessary to 
be able to test the absence of second order serial correlation as mentioned by Arellano and Bond (1991), one of the 
assumptions of the estimation method adopted (GMM).  
The main source of information was the SABI (Iberian Balances Analysis System), which contains accounting and 
financial information on Portuguese and Spanish firms. Among the firms listed in the SABI database: i) those 
without accounting information during the review period were eliminated, ii) only those that met the conditions set 
by the Bank of Portugal in their analyses (total assets, equity, turnover and positive GVA) were included, iii) those 
which were not economically viable, reflected by a positive operational profitability, were excluded iv) only those 
which met the conditions for SMEs to under Decree-Law No. 372/2007 were taken into account, v) companies in the 
financial sector were removed and, finally, vi) only those companies for which information regarding equity 
distribution was available were retained. Given these criteria, a final sample of 4,163 firms was reached. 
Table 1 presents some characteristics of the companies in the sample: distribution of companies by number of 
employees, job creation and turnover by scaled number of employees. Analysis of this table indicates that 89% of the 
companies have fewer than 50 employees. Nevertheless, it is those with 10 or more workers that absorb 90% of the 
labour and have 83% of turnover. It is worth noting that a significant number of companies (43%) have fewer than 
10 employees, but their contribution to generate business and create value is of little importance (17%). Regarding 
companies with 50 or more people, though their number is reduced (11%), they absorb 45% of the workforce and 
account for 36% turnover. 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the sample by class according to number of employees, average values 2003-2008 
Variables Total Less than 10 10 to 49 50 to 249 
 Value Value % Value % Value %
Companies (No.) 4.163 1.777 43 1.928 46 458 11
Employees (No.) 94.539 9.504 10 42.422 45 42.612 45
Turnover (103Eur) 12.313.887 2.037.058 17 5.796.657 47 4.480.172 36
To measure each attribute, we take into account the indicators used by other authors from the accounting information 
given the absence of market values for the population under study (SMEs). The use of operational profitability 
indicators as an expression of corporate performance is supported in many empirical studies, highlighting economic 
profitability (ERA), expressed in the asset’s capacity to generate results (e.g., Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000, Aras, 
Aybars, & Kutlu, 2010, Greenaway, Guariglia, & Yu, 2012, Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2012, Castelli, Dwyer, & Hasan, 
2012, Wang & Sarkis, 2013). 
As it is difficult to reach a consensus on the best way to assess ownership structure and the literature suggests 
different ways to quantify it, we propose ownership concentration and insider ownership as characteristics that 
identify it best, since these are simple and intuitive variables, less prone to measurement error and not subject to the 
problems of weighting. Ownership concentration (C) indicates the percentage of equity held by the two largest 
owners and insider ownership (IO) the part of the equity held by the managing bodies/directors (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003, Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The variables used in the models and sample segmentation criteria are defined in 
Table 2. 
We consider a company young when its age is below the mean of the companies in the sample, yielding a dummy 
variable (YM) which is equal to one if the company is young, and zero otherwise (Pindado et al., 2011). As for the 
nature of the ownership, it is a family company if the main partner/shareholder is an individual or family with at least 
50% of the equity (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, Wang, 2006). The business dimension is evaluated by a set of variables 
to classify firms according to a multicriteria vector that combines the number of employees, turnover and total assets. 
Decree-Law No. 372/2007 is adopted as a basis, gathering together micro, small and average enterprises.  
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Table 2. Variables used in the models and sample segmenting criteria 
Panel A: Variables used in the models
Variable Definition 
Economic return on 
assets 
ERAit = OPit/Ait, where OPit is the operational profitability and Ait is the total 
assets. It measures the capacity of the company’s assets to generate results. 
Ownership 
concentration 
Cit expresses the holdings of the two largest partners/shareholders of the 
company’s equity.
Insider ownership IOit is the equity held by whoever performs management duties. It gives the 
percentage of the ownership held by the managers/directors. 
Dummy 
Young/Mature 
YMit is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the age of the company is lower than the 
mean and zero otherwise. 
Lagged variable X (t-1) denotes that the variable X is lagging by one period. 
Time dummy  D (t) is the dummy of period t.
Panel B: Sample segmenting criteria
Criterion Description
Age  
Young Age of the company is lower than the sample mean
Mature Age of the company is higher than the sample mean
Nature of Ownership  
Family Percentage of family in equity greater than 50%
Non-Family Percentage of family in equity less than 50%
Size  
Micro Classification as a micro enterprise as defined by Decree-Law No. 372/2007
Small Classification as a small enterprise as defined by Decree-Law No. 372/2007
Medium Classification as an average enterprise as defined by Decree-Law No. 
372/2007 
Note: Decree-Law No. 372/2007 defines micro, small and medium businesses. The category of micro, small and 
medium enterprises is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and whose annual turnover does 
not exceed €50 million or whose total annual balance sheet does not exceed €43 million. A small business is defined 
as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover or total annual balance sheet does 
not exceed €10 million. A micro enterprise is defined by employing less than 10 persons and whose annual turnover 
does not exceed €2 million. 
5. Results 
In this section we present the results of the proposed models in order to test the hypotheses. The estimates for the 
parameters in each model were obtained through the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This was followed 
up with tests to assess their quality. In all of the models, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test reveals no correlation 
between the errors, with Hansen’s test validating the instruments used, so that the methodology used is found to be 
suitable. 
5.1 Ownership Concentration and Firm Operational Performance 
Estimation results of the model first formulated using the GMM, are found in Table 3 column I, when considering 
the totality of the sample companies. The values obtained suggest that ownership concentration has a non-linear 
impact on corporate operational profitability, expressed in the significance of regression coefficients. In particular, 
the coefficient of the ownership concentration variable is negative (B1 <0) and its square is positive (B2> 0), which 
represents a quadratic U-shaped relationship. This means that the expropriation hypothesis prevails for low levels of 
control rights and the supervision hypothesis for high levels. The results have revealed themselves significant, unlike 
what happened in Arosa et al. (2010) and Westhead and Howorth (2006), and establish a contrary relationship to that 
obtained by Miguel et al. (2004) for Spanish listed companies. Nevertheless, they are in consonance with the 
findings of Hu and Izumida (2008) for small family businesses in Japan. The negative effect of ownership 
concentration on operational profitability for low levels of concentration suggests that two potential costs prevail. On 
the one hand, there is an incentive for the owner to take actions that increase their personal utility, reducing corporate 
performance, which may be associated with less efficient investment decisions (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). On the 
other hand, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) suggest that as the concentration of family ownership increases there is an 
influence of family control over managers/directors, which can lead to greater entrenchment. The inversion of the 
concavity of the quadratic relationship, over that obtained in other studies focusing on large enterprises, may be 
related to the fact that the latter possess external control systems, professional management and more dispersed 
ownership where the holders of the equity purchase and sell shares in high liquidity securities markets. In listed 
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companies, ownership loses its relevance as a mechanism of supervision, as this is ensured by external (market) 
forces. Conversely, in small businesses internal control systems and more concentrated ownership prevail and less 
efficiency of securities markets is felt. The ownership structure thus plays an important role in disciplining 
managers/directors and significant determines performance for lack of effective external control.  
A quadratic relationship proposed in model 1 shows only one inflection point that can be determined by deriving the 
function in relation to ownership concentration. Calculating the first derivative and making it equal to zero, we 
obtain the variable value where the function reaches an extreme. Since the coefficient of the term of higher degree is 
positive, we can say that the function has a minimum at C1= - (B1/2B2), which for this sample is 68.69%. The fact 
that the coefficient B2 presents a very low value indicates that the parabola has a “very open” U-shape. These values 
allow us to conclude that there is a quadratic relationship between ownership concentration and operational 
profitability as advocated by Hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, concavity is inverted. 
Columns II, III and IV of Table 3 show the results of the estimation of model 1, for the sample segmented by size 
according to the criteria defined in Table 2 (Panel B). The results obtained when considering all firms in the sample 
remain valid for the subsamples: micro, small and medium enterprises. Nevertheless, the break point, where the 
expropriation effect gives rise to the supervision effect, changes. It appears that micro and small enterprises have a 
value of 80.47% and 71.51%, respectively, placing them above the value obtained for the total sample firms. For 
medium-sized companies the inflection point is found at lower levels, 57.04%. The results indicate that as the 
company increases in size, the supervision effect prevails from lower levels of ownership concentration. Thus, the 
estimates suggest that larger firms are subject to mechanisms of higher scrutiny. 
In columns V and VI of Table 3, we consider the segmenting criterion firm age, according to the criterion found in 
Table 2 (Panel B). The model parameters remain significant as the conclusions remain valid for all firms in the 
sample. Nevertheless, the supervision effect of the “mature” companies replaces the expropriation effect at lower 
levels of ownership concentration than obtained for the total sample, with the value of 67.18%. “Young” firms need 
to achieve a concentration of 74.19% for the supervision effect to prevail. Adopting the nature of ownership 
(family/non-family) as a segmenting criterion, the significance of ownership concentration on operational 
profitability is only validated for family businesses (see columns VII and VIII of Table 3). 
Finally, columns IX, X, XI and XII of Table 3 show the estimation of model 1 intersecting two segmenting criteria: 
nature of ownership and age. The coefficients obtained lead us to assert that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and operational profitability are only significant in young family firms. These results suggest that their 
owners are more motivated to expropriate businesses. It is important to highlight the fact that the break point 
presents the highest value within the estimations made, reaching 80.55%. We can say that in family businesses 
ownership concentration becomes significant with regards to operational profitability, largely attributable young 
family firms. 
Table 3. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on operational profitability 
   Total sample Size 
    Micro Small Medium 
     I II III IV 
    Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
   ERAit                     
   ERAi(t-1) 0,36560 0,032750 *** 0,34761 0,040515 *** 0,29735 0,104723 *** 0,28182 0,14601 * 
   Cit -0,00043 0,000148 *** -0,00075 0,000407 * -0,00068 0,000342 ** -0,00089 0,000402 ** 
   C2it 3,16E-06 0,000001 *** 4,64E-06 0,000003 * 4,77E-06 0,000002 ** 7,76E-06 0,000003 ** 
   D (t-4) 0,06120 0,005928 *** 0,07967 0,015513 *** 0,07301 0,014280 *** 0,07669 0,017419 *** 
   D (t-3) 0,05856 0,005950 *** 0,07617 0,015652 *** 0,07375 0,014602 *** 0,07107 0,016097 *** 
   D (t-2) 0,05783 0,005972 *** 0,07624 0,015553 *** 0,07076 0,014741 *** 0,06774 0,015419 *** 
   D (t-1) 0,06127 0,006014 *** 0,07814 0,015589 *** 0,07512 0,014721 *** 0,06884 0,015044 *** 
   D (t) 0,04235 0,006144 *** 0,05178 0,015622 *** 0,06385 0,015066 *** 0,06117 0,015197 *** 
AR(2)   2,540  0,011 1,440  0,149 1,020  0,309 -0,640  0,521
AR(3)  1,040  0,297 1,130  0,258 0,260  0,797 -0,250  0,800
Hansen  17,850  0,022 15,050  0,239 18,140  0,020 6,210  0,624
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Table 3. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on operational profitability (cont.) 
   Age Nature of ownership 
   Young Mature Family Non-Family 
     V VI VII VIII 
    Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
   ERAit                     
   ERAi(t-1) 0,33770 0,040234 *** 0,44287 0,052614 *** 0,37433 0,032751 *** 0,39225 0,091375 *** 
   Cit -0,00048 0,000275 * -0,00039 0,00015 ** -0,00029 0,000175 * -0,00014 0,000316  
   C2it 3,21E-06 0,000002 * 2,87E-06 0,000001 *** 2,04E-06 0,000001 * 1,34E-06 0,000003  
   D (t-4) 0,06727 0,010556 *** 0,05288 0,006445 *** 0,05556 0,006775 *** 0,06095 0,010897 *** 
   D (t-3) 0,06513 0,010564 *** 0,04958 0,006625 *** 0,05338 0,006831 *** 0,05395 0,010955 *** 
   D (t-2) 0,06580 0,01063 *** 0,04716 0,006618 *** 0,05249 0,006811 *** 0,05477 0,011329 *** 
   D (t-1) 0,06989 0,010672 *** 0,05059 0,006649 *** 0,05563 0,006815 *** 0,06135 0,011823 *** 
   D (t) 0,05188 0,01089 *** 0,03186 0,006782 *** 0,03695 0,006917 *** 0,03996 0,012432 *** 
AR(2)   1,960  0,050 0,990  0,321 2,500  0,013 0,950  0,344
AR(3)  0,950  0,344 0,550  0,579 1,320  0,186 -0,100  0,917
Hansen  11,540  0,173 12,880  0,116 14,840  0,062 19,240  0,014
 
Table 3. Results of estimation of impact of ownership concentration on operational profitability (cont.) 
   Family Non-family 
   Young Mature Young Mature 
     IX X XI XII 
    Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
   ERAit                     
   ERAi(t-1) 0,35584 0,0405592 *** 0,43872 0,053639 *** 0,21690 0,128569 * 0,55097 0,107733 *** 
   Cit -0,00058 0,0003073 * -0,00018 0,000218  -0,00046 0,000534  -0,00009 0,000352  
   C2it 3,62E-06 2,03E-06 * 1,27E-06 1,47E-06  4,12E-06 4,54E-06  8,25E-07 3,26E-06  
   D (t-4) 0,07053 0,0117246 *** 0,04577 0,008412 *** 0,08390 0,016454 *** 0,04495 0,012507 *** 
   D (t-3) 0,06887 0,0117487 *** 0,04279 0,008585 *** 0,07523 0,017462 *** 0,03728 0,013616 *** 
   D (t-2) 0,06919 0,0117327 *** 0,04073 0,00856 *** 0,07944 0,017458 *** 0,03574 0,013299 *** 
   D (t-1) 0,07309 0,0117569 *** 0,04330 0,008499 *** 0,08579 0,018076 *** 0,04292 0,014005 *** 
   D (t) 0,05499 0,0119711 *** 0,02539 0,008645 *** 0,06912 0,020407 *** 0,02131 0,014678  
AR(2)   1,840  0,065 0,990  0,321 0,840  0,400 0,760  0,448
AR(3)  0,720  0,472 1,010  0,314 0,920  0,356 -0,680  0,498
Hansen  9,410  0,309 11,940  0,154 8,580  0,379 11,710  0,164
Notes: 
The information required to interpret the tables is as follows: i) estimating the data was performed using GMM 
estimators as dynamic panel data using xtabond2 developed by David Roodman (2006); ii) ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, iii) to eliminate the individual effects, the model was 
estimated after considering the first differences for the variables, iv) Arellano and Bond (AR) is a test of the 
autocorrelation of errors developed in order to verify if there are lags that are not valid instruments, and v) Hansen is 
a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the instruments and the error term. 
ERAit =Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, C = Ownership concentration, and D(t) = Dummy of 
period t. 
www.sciedu.ca/ijba International Journal of Business Administration Vol. 5, No. 3; 2014 
Published by Sciedu Press                        173                          ISSN 1923-4007  E-ISSN 1923-4015 
5.2 The Moderating Effect of Age 
The results of the second model formulated are presented in Table 4, showing the moderating effect of age on the 
relationship established in the previous model. Analysis of the regression coefficients associated with Cit×YMi and 
C2it×YMi allows us to conclude that there is an interaction between ownership concentration and age (i.e., the 
relationship between ownership concentration and operational profitability is moderated by age). The values suggest 
that age influences and enhances the relationship established in the previous model, in line with previous empirical 
results (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003 and Baronitini & Caprio, 2006). The entire model’s estimated coefficients are 
significant, with the previous references remaining valid, allowing Hypothesis 2 to be validated. 
Table 4. Results of the estimation of the impact of ownership concentration on operational profitability, with the 
moderating effect of age 
    Total sample 
   Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
  ERAit      
  ERAi(t-1) 0,36906 0,032617 *** 
  Cit -0,00051 0,000154 *** 
  C2it 3,73E-06 1,12E-06 *** 
 Cit ×YMi 2,15E-04 0,000099 ** 
 C2it ×YMi -1,75E-06 1,02E-06 * 
  D (t-4) 0,05988 0,005842 *** 
  D (t-3) 0,05737 0,005863 *** 
  D (t-2) 0,05686 0,005886 *** 
  D (t-1) 0,06056 0,005934 *** 
  D (t) 0,04184 0,006070 *** 
AR(2)   2,56  0,01
AR(3)  1,07  0,284
Hansen  18,08  0,054
Notes: ERAit =Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, C = Ownership concentration, YMit is a dummy 
which is equal to 1 if the age of the company is lower than the mean and zero otherwise, and D(t) = Dummy of period 
t. AR = Arellano and Bond test, Hansen = Hansen test. 
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
5.3 Insider Ownership and Corporate Operational Profitability 
Estimation results of the model that establishes a link between operational profitability and insider ownership (model 
3) are summarized in Table 5. The coefficients of the columns I and II are all shown to be meaningful, validating a 
quadratic relationship between insider ownership and operational profitability. It is not possible, however, to support 
the cubic specification of the model with the values obtained when this specification is considered (see column III). 
The coefficients for IO and IO2, respectively negative and positive, constitute an management entrenchment effect 
and convergence of interests. For insider ownership values up to 79.10%, operational profitability decreases, 
suggesting that insiders are less interested in the welfare of the other owners and that their greater security is more 
likely to entrench them. For higher values, the increases in insider ownership are translated into increased operational 
profitability, where the added incentives that managers/directors have to maximize the value can contribute to their 
increased participation. The results do not allow the cubic specification formulated in Hypothesis 3 to be validated; 
however, the coefficients of the variables IO and IO2 support a quadratic relationship between insider ownership and 
operational profitability. 
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Table 5. Results of the estimation of the impact insider ownership on operational profitability 
  Insider ownership
    Linear Squared Cubic 
   I   II   III  
   Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
  ERAit       
  ERAi(t-1) 0,36615 0,032749 *** 0,36706 0,032709 *** 0,36719 0,03271 ***
  IOit -0,00011 0,000022 *** -0,00038 0,000086 *** -0,00061 0,00022 ***
  IO2it     2,38E-06 0,000001 *** 8,56E-06 4,96E-06 *
 IO3it     -3,95E-08 3,04E-08
  D (t-4) 0,05735 0,003467 *** 0,06094 0,004009 *** 0,06150 0,00413 ***
  D (t-3) 0,05452 0,003518 *** 0,05812 0,004056 *** 0,05867 0,00418 ***
  D (t-2) 0,05372 0,003549 *** 0,05735 0,004085 *** 0,05791 0,00421 ***
  D (t-1) 0,05712 0,003551 *** 0,06078 0,004090 *** 0,06135 0,00422 ***
  D (t) 0,03791 0,003727 *** 0,04161 0,004267 *** 0,04217 0,00439 ***
AR(2)   2,56  0,010 2,57  0,010 2,57  0,010
AR(3)  1,04  0,299 1,03  0,303 1,03  0,301
Hansen  15,27  0,018 15,4 0,017 15,43  0,017
Notes: ERAit = Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, IO= Insider ownership, and D(t) = Dummy of 
period t. 
AR = Arellano and Bond test, Hansen = Hansen test. 
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
5.4 Operational Profitability and Ownership Concentration 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of model 4. Analysis of these results shows a causal relationship between the 
operational profitability with one period lag and ownership concentration. The value of the operational profitability 
coefficient is positive and significant validating not only the relationship of reciprocity, but also the determinant role 
it has on ownership concentration. The results reveal the importance of operational profitability, namely in the 
previous period, on ownership concentration, as suggested by Hypothesis 4, which is consistent with previous 
empirical evidence (e.g., Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006).  
Table 6. Results of the estimation of the impact of operational profitability on ownership concentration on yield 
grounds 
    Total sample 
   Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
  Cit      
  Ci(t-1) 0,05388 0,081832  
  ERAit (dropped)   
  ERAi(t-1) 191,16210 77,098000 ** 
  D (t-4) -0,64643 0,149352 *** 
  D (t-3) -0,51151 0,173992 *** 
  D (t-2) -0,12561 0,112239  
  D (t-1) 0,69834 0,221077 *** 
AR(2) -2,500 0,012
AR(3) -0,380  0,701
Hansen  5,980 0,112
Notes: ERAit = Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, C = Ownership concentration, and D(t) = 
Dummy of period t. 
AR = Arellano and Bond test, Hansen = Hansen test. 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
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5.5 Operational Profitability and Insider Ownership 
The estimation results of model 5, which establishes a relationship between operational profitability and insider 
ownership, are found in Table 7. The coefficients of operational profitability (current and lagging by one period) are 
statistically significant, with a negative relationship with the insider ownership. The insider ownership held in the 
previous period is also a determinant of insider ownership at the current time. The inverse relationship between 
operational profitability and insider ownership suggests that - as a result of expropriation practices performed by the 
controlling owner and by allocating managerial/directorial positions to people appointed by him - operational 
profitability is not a sufficient incentive to induce greater participation by managers/directors in corporate ownership. 
The absence of a clear distinction between individual and corporate property, the propensity to give up, in the short 
run, income (safeguarding the business for future generations) and reduced professionalism of the 
management/administration can contribute to operational profitability not being considered an sufficiently relevant 
incentive for the participation of managers/directors in the ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003, Wang, 2006, Arosa 
et al., 2010). The estimation results of the model and the negative coefficients of the ERAit and ERAi(t-1) support 
Hypothesis 5, but with an opposite impact (negative) to what was formulated. 
Table 7. Estimation of impact of operational profitability on insider ownership 
    Sample 
   Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
  IOit      
  IOi(t-1) 0,14744 0,081506 * 
  ERAit -35,02412 7,595487 *** 
 ERAi(t-1) -9,40107 2,873151 *** 
  D (t-4) 5,98738 0,587962 *** 
  D (t-3) 5,35080 0,517579 *** 
  D (t-2) 3,78319 0,410201 *** 
  D (t-1) 3,20760 0,321417 *** 
AR(2)   0,81  0,418 
AR(3)  -1,18  0,239 
Hansen  24,88  0,024 
Notes: ERAit = Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, IO= Insider ownership, and D(t) = Dummy of 
period t. AR = Arellano and Bond test, Hansen = Hansen test. 
*** Significant at1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
5.6 Robustness Analysis 
The models proposed require a methodology that makes use of the instrumental variables as a mechanism to control 
the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The best choice is a GMM estimator because it incorporates 
all of the others (Ogaki, 1993). Furthermore, GMM is particularly suitable for this study given the dynamic nature of 
the variables. Previous studies show that in the context of dynamic models, various estimation techniques generate 
biased estimators. Specifically, the ordinary least squares method (OLS) yields an overestimation of the parameters 
by virtue of the presence of individual endogeneity (Hsiao, 2003). Moreover, the estimators with centred variables 
(Wihin-groups) give rise to default values (Nickell, 1981). More recently, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) show 
that the first difference GMM estimators are subject to a problem of weak instruments. As a result Blundell and 
Bond (1998) propose the system GMM in the context of dynamic models. 
To validate that the system GMM is the best suited to our study, we compared the results obtained (Equation 1) with 
this methodology with other estimation techniques. The results obtained are shown in Table 8. The lag ERA 
coefficient, using the reference estimation method (System GMM), is 0.36560 (column IV). As Hsiao (2003) 
suggests, the coefficient obtained by the OLS estimator, 0.64435 (column I) has a higher value. The value of the 
coefficient, estimated by Within-Groups, 0.13015, is clearly inferior. Contrary to the OLS and the Within-groups, it 
is not possible to establish any specific relationship between the first difference GMM and the System GMM. As 
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shown in Table 8 (Column III), the yield coefficient of the offset is 0.15562, smaller than the coefficient obtained by 
the System GMM (0.36560).  
Given the values obtained and according to the authors indicated, we can conclude that System GMM is the method 
which best serves the purposes of our work. Thus, all of the models were estimated using the System GMM. The 
methodology allows the endogeneity of the variables in the model to be controlled, with the inclusion of lags of the 
second and third period, lags (2, 3), as instruments in the equations in differences and with only one lag in the 
equations for levels, as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Tests were carried out to assess the quality of the specification models. Through Hansen’s J overidentification 
statistic, the selected instruments were validated, and the AR (2) and AR (3) statistics developed by Arellano and 
Bound (1991) revealed the absence of second-order correlation in the first residual differences; no problems were 
identified in the models. 
Table 8. Results of model I with by use of different estimators 
                             
     
Ordinary least squares 
estimator  Within-groups estimator First difference GMM System GMM 
       I     II     III     IV   
    Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
   ERAit                     
   ERAi(-1)t 0,64435 0,022879 *** 0,13015 0,029984 *** 0,15562 0,054694 *** 0,36560 0,032750 *** 
   Cit -0,00031 0,000116 *** -0,00048 0,000241 ** -0,00030 0,000218  -0,00043 0,000149 *** 
   C2it 2,22E-06 0,000001 *** 3,37E-06 0,000002 * 1,68E-06 0,000002  3,16E-06 0,000001 *** 
   D (t-4) 0,01991 0,001492 *** (dropped)   0,03865 0,006906 *** 0,06120 0,005929 *** 
   D (t-3) 0,01666 0,001463 *** -0,00227 0,000976 ** 0,02721 0,003480 *** 0,05856 0,005950 *** 
   D (t-2) 0,01574 0,001440 *** -0,00435 0,000996 *** 0,02062 0,002864 *** 0,05783 0,005973 *** 
   D (t-1) 0,02012 0,001456 *** -0,00116 0,001090  0,02203 0,002552 *** 0,06127 0,006014 *** 
   D (t) (dropped)   -0,01991 0,001476 ***     0,04235 0,006145 *** 
                             
AR(2) in first dif.: Z =            1,610  0,108 2,540  0,011
AR(3) in first dif.: Z =            1,250  0,210 1,040  0,297
Hansen test: Chi2 =           1,220  0,543 17,850  0,022
Notes: ERAit = Economic return on assets of the firm i at the period t, C = C = Ownership concentration, and D(t) = 
Dummy of period t. 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we analyzed the relationship between operational profitability, ownership concentration and insider 
ownership, extending the previous literature in this area, highlighting their endogenous nature and dynamics. The 
control of unobserved heterogeneity and individual endogeneity, provided by panel data the methodology allows role 
of ownership concentration and insider ownership to be evaluated as control mechanisms within the governance of 
small firms. 
To achieve this goal, several steps were taken. First, we analyzed the relationship between ownership concentration 
and corporate operational profitability through a quadratic specification, which is validated for the companies under 
study and for the subsamples generated from the criteria of size, age and nature of owership. When we segment the 
sample by the nature of ownership, the empirical evidence shows that the relationship is valid only for family 
businesses, in line with the potential benefits associated with these companies. The results are in line with those 
obtained by Hu and Izumida (2008) for Japanese family businesses. They confirm the relationship Arosa et al. (2010) 
formulated and which we were unable validate it in the context of unlisted Spanish companies and suggest a 
U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and performance – the inverse of that obtained by Miguel et 
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al. (2004) on listed companies context. Nevertheless, for family businesses, the relationship differs depending on age 
– young companies show a negative relationship between ownership concentration and operational profitability for 
low levels of control rights, so that the expropriation hypothesis prevails; and they show a positive relationship for 
high levels of ownership concentration, as a consequence of the supervision hypothesis. 
The next step reinforces the role of ownership concentration on operational profitability, when this is moderated by 
firm age. During the third step, the results confirm the management entrenchment effect and the convergence of 
interests in the relationship established between the insider ownership and operational profitability. They do not 
validate, however, the cubic relationship established by Miguel et al. (2004).  
The inverse causality relationship tested in the fourth and fifth steps brings new evidence to the existing literature. 
The results are in line with the findings of studies conducted in the United States (e.g., Cho, 1998 and Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001) and validate the relationship not identified in Hu and Izumida (2008) and Arosa et al. (2010) on 
samples of similar companies to those used in our study.  
Additional research is needed, in our view, to overcome some constraints found in this work. Firstly it is very 
difficult to carry out a comparative study between different institutional contexts due to the absence/scarcity of 
databases with unlisted companies, which allow the role of ownership concentration in disciplining 
managers/directors and business performance to be assessed in the absence of effective external control mechanisms. 
Additionally, the lack of data also prevented us to make a clear distinction between the company's founder and other 
members, to assess the relevance of the ‘generation effect’.  
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